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PROBABILITY THEORY MEETS RES IPSA
LOQUITUR
David Kaye*t
Day in and day out, attorneys, judges, and jurors must estimate probabilities. No, the jury decides, it is not very likely that
the fashionable physician murdered his elderly patients to expedite his receipt of their legacies. Yes, the prosecutor insists, the
senator must have known that the cash contribution he accepted
was the gift of a foreign national. No, the expert witness testifies,
chances are that the plane crash that left the plaintiff a penniless
widow was the result not of pilot error but rather of an unexpected
summer squall.
To be sure, we rarely quantify such estimates of probability
and almost never adopt the terminology and mathematics of
probability theory to resolve such matters. Nevertheless, the
mathematical theory of probability' can be, and has been, applied to legal problems in various ways. Some have used the
theory descriptively, to model the reasoning of jurors' or the rules
of evidence. 3 Others have used it normatively, to urge reforms in
* Professor of Law, Arizona State University. S.B. 1968, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology; A.M. 1969, Harvard University; J.D. 1972, Yale University. - Ed.
t A version of this paper was presented at a session of the Faculty Workshop Pro.
gram of the School of Law at the University of Washington, and I am grateful to those
who participated for their preparation, criticisms, and insights. I would also like to thank
Edward Cleary, Dennis Karjala, Willard Pedrick, and especially Richard L-mpert for
their comments on an earlier version of this Article.
1. By the mathematical theory of probability, I mean the axiomatic description of
probability spaces conventionally accepted by mathematicians. See, e.g., H. BRUNK, AN
INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS 21-31 (1965). On the epistemological problems
with the concept of probability, see, e.g., T. FINE, THEORIES OF PROBABILITY: AN ExAMINATION OF FOUNDATIONS (1973); H. KYBURG, THE LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICAL
INFERENCE (1974).
2. See, e.g., Iversen, Operationalizing the Concept of Probability in Legal.Socia
Science Research, 5 LAw & Socy. REv. 331 (1971); Simon & Mahan, Quantifying Burdens
of Proof; A View from the Bench, Bar and Classroom, 5 LAw & SocY. REv. 319 (1971);
Simon, "Beyond a Reasonable Doubt"--An Experimental Attempt at Quantification,6
J. APPLIED BEHAVIORAL SCI. 203 (1970).

3. See, e.g., L. COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE (1977) (arguing that a nonstandard theory of inductive probability must be developed to describe the rules of evidence); Boole, On the Application of the Theory of Probabilities to the Question of the
Combination of Testimonies or Judgments, 21 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SociurY OF
EDINBURGH 597 (1857); Schum, On the BehavioralRichness of CascadedInference Models:
Examples in Jurisprudence, in CoGNITIVE THEORY 149 (N. Castellan ed. 1977).
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the treatment of quantitative evidence 4 or in the framing of legal
rules.5 Still others have used it heuristically, to explain rules governing proof of facts.'
This Article uses probability theory normatively in an effort
to clarify one aspect of the famous tort doctrine known as res ipsa
loquitur. It does not urge that jurors be instructed in probability
theory or be equipped with microprocessors. Rather, it seeks an
accurate statement of the res ipsa doctrine in ordinary language.

In particular, this Article will show that the conventional formulation of the doctrine is misleading at best, and should be re-

placed with a more careful statement of the conditions warranting the res ipsa inference. 7 To this end, Section I briefly surveys
4. See, e.g., Fairley, ProbabilisticAnalysis of Indentification Evidence, 2 J. LEGAL
STUD. 493 (1973); Finkelstein & Fairley, A BayesianApproach to IdentificationEvidence,
83 HARv.L. REV. 489 (1970); Note, The Evidentiary Uses of Neutron Activation Analysis,
59 CALIF. L. REV. 997 (1971).

5. See, e.g., Lempert, Uncovering "Nondiscernible"Differences: EmpiricalResearch
and the Jury Size Cases, 73 MICH.L. REV. 643 (1975); Zeisel,. . . And Then There Were
None: The Diminutionof the FederalJury, 38 U. Cm. L. REV. 710 (1971); Note, The Effect
of Jury Size on the Probabilityof Conviction: An Evaluationof Williams v. Florida, 22
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 529 (1971).

Probability calculations are sometimes used in another, arguably normative sense; in
appropriate cases, they are introduced to prove disputed facts, such as the presence of
discrimination in the selection of a jury venire or in the hiring of employees. For examples
and discussion of jury venire cases, see Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972); Salary
v. Wilson, 415 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1969); De Cani, StatisticalEvidence in Jury Discrimination Cases, 65 J. CraM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 234 (1974); Zeisel, Dr. Spock and the Case of
the Vanishing Women Jurors, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 1 (1969); Finkelstein, The Application
of Statistical Decision Theory to the Jury Discrimination Cases, 80 HARv. L. REv. 338
(1966). For discussions of employment discrimination cases, see Shoben, DifferentialPassFail Rates in Employment Testing: Statistical Proof Under Title VII, 91 HARv. L. REv.

793 (1978); Shoben, Probingthe DiscriminatoryEffects of Employee Selection Procedures
with DisparateImpact Analysis Under Title VII,56 TEXAS L. REV. 1 (1977); Note, Beyond
the PrimaFacie Case in Employment DiscriminationLaw: StatisticalProofand Rebuttal,
89 HARV. L. REV. 387 (1975).
6. See, e.g., Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1021 (1977); Kaplan,
Decision Theory and the FactfindingProcess, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1065 (1968); Kornstein, A
Bayesian Model of Harmless Error,5 J. LEGAL STUD. 121 (1976); cf. Note, A Probabilistic
Analysis of the Doctrine of Mutuality of CollateralEstoppel, 76 MICH. L. REv. 612 (1978)
(upholding mutuality through heuristic use of probability theory). This use of probability
theory as a heuristic device combines the descriptive and normative modes of discourse.
Where the mathematical model accounts for the legal rules, it tends to justify the law;
where the legal phenomena cannot be reconciled with the model, the law tends to be
perceived as irrational and in need of revision.
7. In discussing how the res ipsa doctrine should be phrased, and hence what a jury
should be told (or what standard a judge as factfinder should use), this Article assumes
that rationality - as generally defined in decision theory or economic theory - is the only
relevant normative criterion. See, e.g., W. BAUMOL, ECONOMIC THEORY AND OPERATIONS
ANALYSIS (4th ed. 1977); J. VON NEUMANN & 0. MORGENSTERN, -THEORY OF GAMES AND
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (2d ed. 1947). As has been noted elsewhere, although we arguably
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the legal doctrine, or, more precisely, the aspect of the doctrine
that will be criticized. Section II develops a mathematical apparatus and uses it to expose the weakness in the current version of
res ipsa loquitur. Finally, Section III summarizes and elaborates
the conclusions reached.in Section II - conclusions that suggest
which cases should reach a jury and what instructions the jury
should receivre.
Despite the introduction of mathematical terminology, these
conclusions are by no means the product of a rigorous, impregnable argument. They rest on the sort of rough generalizations
about people and things that are common to all legal arguments.
Furthermore, the version of the res ipsa doctrine advocated here
does not correspond exactly to the ideal mathematical formulation. But even if the recommended changes in the res ipsa doctrine are controversial, this excursion into the mathematics of
probability will compel us to think clearly about a subject often
beset with beguilingly simple but potentially confusing phraseology. Indeed, it may be in this regard that we can gain most from
the exercise.
I. THE LEGAL DOCTRINE
The latinism "res ipsa loquitur" appears to have been introduced into the law of torts by Chief Baron Pollock more than a
century ago. In Byrne v. Boadle,8 a case brought by a hapless
pedestrian injured by a barrel of flour that tumbled from a window in the defendant's warehouse, Pollock observed: "There are
certain cases of which it may be said res ipsa loquitur ....
[T]he mere fact of an accident's having occurred is evidence of
negligence . .

. . "I

As this seminal statement of the doctrine

makes plain, res ipsa loquitur is a rule of circumstantial evidence.' 0 It permits a jury to infer from a circumstance - the
employ jurors in large part to inject concerns other than rationality into the factfinding
process, the normative model embodied in homo economicus is the one appropriately used
in most discussions of jury factfinding. See Lempert, supra note 6, at 1023 n.14.
8. 2 H. & C. 722, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Ex. 1863).
9. 2 H. & C. at 725, 159 Eng. Rep. at 300 (oral argument), reprinted in W. PROSSER,
J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERLUS ON ToRTs 251, 252 (6th ed. 1976)
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER, WADE & SCHWARTZ]. For recent cases applying res ipsa to
falling objects, see, e.g., Jackson v. H.H. Robertson Co., 118 Ariz. 29, 574 P.2d 822 (1978);
Bond v. Otis Elevator Co., 388 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. 1965).
10. See, e.g., Eaton Fruit Co. v. California Spray-Chem. Corp., 103 Ariz. 461, 463,
445 P.2d 437, 439 (1968); Gilbert v. Korvette's, Inc., 457 Pa. 602, 611, 327 A.2d 94, 99
(1974); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 19.5, at 1079 (1956) [hereinafter
cited as HARPER & JAMES].
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injury to the plaintiff - that the defendant was negligent." In the
abstract, this inference seems reasonable enough. Surely, some
accidents could hardly happen unless someone is at fault. 2
The problem for developing a workable legal doctrine lies in
specifying which accidents are of this character. The all-butuniversally accepted formulation, codified in section 328 D of the

Restatement of Torts, provides:
It may be inferred that harm suffered by the plaintiff is caused by
negligence of the defendant when ... the event is of a kind which
ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence. .... 11
11. This, at least, describes the general rule. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 46, 49 (1948); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTS § 328 D, Comment b, at 157 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT]. The procedural effect of the inference varies somewhat among jurisdictions and fact situations. See, e.g., Mobil Chem. Co. v. Bell, 517
S.W.2d 245, 251-52 (Tex. 1974); RESTATEMENT, supra, § 328 D, Comment d, at 158 &
Comment m, at 165; PRossER, WADE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 9, at 278-79.
12. In some instances, res ipsa may be applied even though this empirical foundation
is lacking. The ability of defendants in similar cases to supply probative evidence, combined with the inability of plaintiffs to do so, may support a rule that permits an inference
against defendants. Suppose, for instance, that commercial aircraft frequently crash despite reasonable care on the part of the carrier, and that negligence rather than strict
liability governs the cause of action. A court might still wish to allow the inference of
negligence to encourage commercial carriers to install recording equipment that might be
salvageable and might suggest the causes of at least some crashes. Most cases that have
held res ipsa inapplicable to unexplained airplane crashes, however, have simply rejected
the premise that aircraft frequently crash only if someone has been negligent. See, e.g.,
Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp., 545 F.2d 422, 429-30 (5th Cir. 1977), revd. on other
grounds, 436 U.S. 618 (1978); Cox v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 379 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1044 (1968); Widmyer v. Southeast Skyways, Inc., 584 P.2d 1, 14
(Alaska 1978). For a commentary emphasizing the superior knowledge rationale for res
ipsa, see, e.g., M. SHAN, RES IPSA LoQurruR (1945); Jaffe, Res Ipsa Loquitur Vindicated,
1 BUFFALO L. REV. 1 (1951); Carpenter, Res Ipsa Loquitur: A Rejoinder to Professor
Prosser, 10 S. CAL. L. REv. 467 (1937).
13. In addition, the Restatement contains provisos linking the defendant with the
inferred negligence. Section 328 D also requires that "(b) other responsible causes, including the conduct of the plaintiff and third persons, are sufficiently eliminated by the
evidence; and (c) the indicated negligence is within the scope of the defendant's duty to
the plaintiff." REsTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 328 D, at 156. In speaking of "Sufficiently
eliminating" some other possible causes apparently compatible with reasonable care by
everyone involved, subsection (b) overlaps subsection (a).
The Restatement formulation or minor variations of it are ubiquitously followed. See,
e.g., Widmyer v. Southeast Skyways, Inc., 584 P.2d 1, 11 (Alaska 1978); Jackson v. H.H.
Robertson Co., 118 Ariz. 29, 574 P.2d 822 (1978); Renfro v. J.D. Coggins Co., 71 N.M. 310,
378 P.2d 130 (1963); Brannon v. Wood, 251 Or. 349, 444 P.2d 558 (1968); Gilbert v.
Korvette's, Inc., 457 Pa. 602, 327 A.2d 94 (Pa. 1974); ARLz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-561 (1976).
One common varidnt is supplied by both Prosser and Wigmore. Those authors state that
for the inference of negligence to be permitted,
(1) the event must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in'the absence of
someone's negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within
the exclusive control of the defendant; (3) it must not have been due to any volun-

1460

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 77:1456

This formulation seems so obviously correct and so well entrenched as to be beyond the pale of serious criticism. Indeed, it
serves well enough in the preponderance of cases. Nevertheless,
courts have generated a bewildering variety of verbiage in determining what makes an accident the type that does not ordinarily
occur in the absence of someone's negligence.' 4 Some have suggested that all possible causes of the accident except for negligence must be "excluded,"' 5 or "sufficiently eliminated,"'" or that
the likelihood of these other causes must be "so reduced that the
jury can reasonably find" negligence, 7 or that the plaintiff must
exhibit a "balance of the probabilities" favoring negligence.'6
tary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff.
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRns § 39, at 214 (4th ed. 1971); 4 J. WGMOE,
EVIDENCE § 2509 (1st ed. 1905). See also HARPER & JAMES, supra note 10, § 19.5, at 1081.
14. The Restatement conspicuously fails to supply any standard for ascertaining
when an event is of this kind. The commentary to § 328 D explains only that there must
be "a basis of past experience which reasonably permits" this conclusion. RESTATEMENT,
supra note 11, § 328 D, Comment c, at 158. Similarly, most courts have been content
to rely on the proposition that "general knowledge" or expert testimony is sufficient to
make the necessary showing. E.g., Williams v. United States, 218 F.2d 473, 476 (5th
Cir. 1955); Widmyer v. Southeast Skyways, Inc., 584 P.2d 1, 14 (Alaska 1978); Jackson
v. H.H. Robertson Co., 118 Ariz. 29, 32, 574 P.2d 822, 825 (1978); Cox v. Wilson, 267
S.W.2d 83, 84 (Ky. 1954); Mobil Chem. Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245, 252 (Tex. 1974). See
also RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 328 D, Comment d, at 158-59.
15. E.g., Weaver v. Shell Co., 13 Cal. App. 2d 643, 57 P.2d 571, 572-73 (1936); Martin
v. Powell, 101 So. 2d 610 (Fla. App. 1958); Frank Fehr Brewing Co. v. Corleyn, 265 Ky.
308, 96 S.W.2d 860, 865 (1936).
16. E.g., Gilbert v. Korvette's, Inc., 457 Pa. 602, 614, 327 A.2d 94, 101 (1974); cf.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 328 D (1) (b) (incorporating a similar requirement).
17. Mobil Chem. Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245, 251 (Tex. 1974).
18. E.g., St. Paul Fire & Life Mar. Ins. Co. v. Watkins, 261 Or. 473, 477, 495 P.2d
265, 267 (1972); Siversonv. Weber, 57 Cal. 2d 834, 372 P.2d 97, 22 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1962);
Tucker v. Lombardo, 47 Cal. 2d 457, 465, 303 P.2d 1041, 1046 (1956); Zentz v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 39 Cal. 2d 436, 442, 247 P.2d 344, 347 (1952). Of all the articulations of what
must be "generally known" or attested to by an expert, the most popular seems to be this
"balance of the probabilities" test. Certainly, most modem cases that analyze res ipsa in
such detail seem to propound that approach. See, e.g., Hakensen v. Ennis, 584 P.2d 1138,
1139 (Alaska 1978); Riedisser v. Nelson, 111 Ariz. 542, 544, 534 P.2d 1052, 1054 (1975);
Brannon v. Wood, 251 Or. 349, 444 P.2d 558 (1968). Furthermore, commentary appears
to favor the "balance of the probabilities" test. See, e.g., HARPER & JAMES, supra note 10,
§ 19.5, at 1078. When courts adopt this nomenclature, however, they may be referring to
either of two balances: (1) the balance between (a) the probability that an accident will
occur if someone is negligent and (b) the probability that an accident will occur if no one
is negligent; or (2) the balance between (c) the probability that defendant was negligent
given that the accident occurred and (d) the probability that defendant was not negligent
given that the accident occurred. Most courts seem to contemplate the second relationship
when they talk of balancing probabilities. See, e.g., Hakensen v. Ennis, 584 P.2d 1138,
1139 (Alaska 1978); Mobil Chem. Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245, 252 (Tex. 1974) ("It is
sufficient if. . . the negligence . . . probably occurred, so that the reasonable probabilities point to the defendant. . . ."); RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 328 D, Comment e, at
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Even more distressingly, the very phrase "ordinarily does not
occur in the absence of negligence," if taken literally, inaccurately specifies when the res ipsa inference of negligence is empirically well-founded.
The difficulty with the phrase "ordinarily does not occur in
the absence of negligence" is most evident in cases concerning
accidents that take place only infrequently. In the bulk of these
cases, the courts recognize that the rarity of the injury does not
alone imply negligence. For instance, in one well-known case,
Brannon v. Wood,"9 a man went into a hospital to have a tumor

(specifically, a meningocele) removed from the back of his chest
and came out paralyzed from the waist down. The paralysis resulted from emergency measures taken to halt internal hemor20
rhaging at the site of the excised tumor, near the spinal cord.
The trial court not only refused to instruct the jury along res ipsa
lines, but also propounded the defendant physician's proposed
instruction that the mere existence of the injury was no evidence

of negligence. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed, purportedly
because the plaintiff had not shown that his injury was the sort

that "ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence.

12

"The test," the court emphasized, "is not whether a

particular injury rarely occurs, but rather, when it occurs, is it
ordinarily the result of negligence.

22

"Ordinarily the result of

159 ("Where the probabilities are at best evenly divided between negligence and its
absence, it becomes the duty of the court to direct the jury that there is no sufficient
proof. . . . It is enough that the facts proved reasonably permit the conclusion that
negligence is the more probable explanation."). A number of courts, however, can be
understood to concern themselves with the first two probabilities, apparently assuming
that if probability (a) is greater than probability (b), then probability (c) is large enough
to support a finding of negligence. This Article disputes that assumption.
19. 251 Or. 349, 444 P.2d 558 (1968), reprintedin PROSSER, WADE & SCHWARTZ, supra
note 9, at 257-62.
20. Many medical procedures, like the surgery in Brannon, are generally accepted as
appropriate therapy although they carry some risk of serious complications. Cancer chemotherapy is potentially immunosuppressive and may impair important host defenses.
Bakemeier, Principles of Medical Oncology and Cancer Chemotherapy, in CLINICAL ONCOLOGY FOR MEDICAL STUDENTS AND PHYSICIANS 90, 94 (4th ed. 1974). Pertussis vaccine
sometimes induces brain damage, convulsions, and a strange screaming phenomenon in
infants. Mortimer, Immunization Against Infectious Disease, 200 SCIENCE 902, 906 (1978).
Renal transplantation may be followed by persistent hyperparathyroidism, necessitating
further surgery. Merril & Carpenter, Transplantation,in HARRISON'S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 359, 365 (7th ed. 1974). Prolonged treatment with antipsychotic medications
can result, irreversibly, in the movement disorder tardive dyskinesia. Berger, Medical
Treatment of Mental Illness, 200 SCIENCE 974, 977 (1978).
21. 251 Or. at 355, 444 P.2d at 561.
22. 251 Or. at 358, 444 P.2d at 562 (citation omitted).
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negligence," the court finally stated, means simply "more likely
the result of negligence than some other cause." 23 Since neither

general knowledge nor expert testimony revealed that the
paralysis was more likely to result from negligence than from

another cause, the court concluded that the plaintiff invoked res
ipsa loquitur in vain.2 4
In a number of cases, however, the courts treat the question

of what "ordinarily" occurs in the absence of negligence quite
differently. In Dacus v. Miller," for instance, the Oregon Supreme Court again considered a plaintiff who had suffered
paralysis following surgery. 8 This time, however, the plaintiff
had secured an expert to testify that if due care were exercised
in the type of operation involved, paralysis would not "ordinarily
occur." Apparently bemused by the words "ordinarily occur,"
the court held that this testimony was adequate to establish negligence. 2 Thus, Dacus creates telling evidence of malpractice
from the mere fact that complications of surgery are rare, and
23. 251 Or. at 361, 444 P.2d at 563.
24. For comparable cases, see, e.g., Siverson v. Weber, 57 Cal. 2d 834, 372 P.2d 97,
22 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1962); Sommers v. Sisters of Charity, 277 Or. 549, 554-55, 561 P.2d 603,
606-07 (1977); Austin v. Sisters of Charity, 256 Or. 179, 187-88, 470 P.2d 939, 943 (1970).
25. 257 Or. 337, 479 P.2d 229 (1971).
26. The defendant physician had performed a radical mastoidectomy revision, during
which he removed a mass of cholesteatoma. He admitted that during this surgery, the
plaintiff's left facial nerve was injured, causing partial facial paralysis, but contended that
such injury to the facial nerve was an inherent risk of the surgery. There was no claim
that the surgery itself was unnecessary or that the patient had not been adequately
informed of the risk.
27. 257 Or. at 339-41, 479 P.2d at 230-31. The surgeon who performed the corrective
surgery testified that he had performed 1,500 to 2,000 middle ear surgeries, including
about 35 operations to correct facial nerve injuries. 257 Or. at 340 nn. 1 & 3, 479 P.2d at
230 n.1, 231 n.3. Several experts testified that injury to the facial nerve was an" 'inherent
risk'" in radical mastoidectomies, but rarely occurred. 257 Or. at 341, 479 P.2d at 23031.
28. 257 Or. at 339-41, 479 P.2d at 230-31. The trial court refused to give a res ipsa
instruction, and the jury found for the defendant. The plaintiff appealed, urging in part
that an adequate foundation for res ipsa had been laid. The supreme court agreed, but
nonetheless affirmed on the theory that the instruction requested by the plaintiff was
defective in form and, for that reason, should not have been given. 257 Or. at 341-44, 497
P.2d at 231-32.
One member of the court, Chief Justice O'Connell, recognized that the expert testimony about what "ordinarily" occurs did not imply that injury to the facial nerve in
radical mastoidectomies is more likely the result of negligence than of "inherent risk" in
the operation. His concurring opinion follows the Brannon logic in substituting, without
explanation, the latter consideration for the canonical "ordinarily does not occur in the
absence of negligence." Compare 257 Or. at 345-46, 479 P.2d at 233 (O'Connell, C.J.,
concurring) with Brannon v. Wood, 251 Or. 349, 360-61, 444 P.2d 558, 563 (1968).
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hence do not "ordinarily" occur if reasonable care is exercised. 21
This reasoning from the premise that an injury is unusual to
the conclusion that it does not ordinarily occur in the absence of
negligence - reasoning by no means confined to medical malpractice cases"0 - is surely suspect. Yet the fallacy is not easily

exposed by recourse to the traditional "ordinarily does not occur
in the absence of negligence" language. Contrary to the Brannon
court's pronouncement, this phrase is not quite the same as
"more likely the result of negligence than some other cause." To
explain why not in detail is the burden of the next Section, but
it may be helpful to sketch a facet of the difficulty here. Suppose
we try to rewrite each proposition as a statement about probabili-

ties. The proposition that an injury does not ordinarily occur in
the absence of negligence is equivalent to the proposition that the
injury is rare if reasonable care is exercised. This statement, in

turn, means that the probability of the injury given reasonable
care is small, 3' and it is what was testified to in Dacus. On the

other hand, the proposition that an injury is more likely the result
of negligence than of some other cause - the proposition that the

court said was not made out in Brannon - seems to express a
relationship between two quite different probabilities. This

Brannon proposition seems to mean that, given the injury, the
probability that the defendant was negligent exceeds the probability that the defendant exercised reasonable care.32 Or that
same proposition may relate to the converse of those conditional
probabilities; it would then state that the probability of injury

given negligence is larger than that of injury given reasonable
29. In a footnote, the Dacus court evinced some uncertainty over the relationship
between the Mayor-Dacus line of cases and Brannon. 257 Or. at 340 n.2, 479 P.2d at 230
n.2.
30. See, e.g., Widmyer v. Southeast Skyways, Inc., 584 P.2d 1, 14 (Alaska 1978); St.
Paul Fire & Life Mar. Ins. Co. v. Watkins, 261 Or. 473, 477, 495 P.2d 265, 267 (1972).
31. It could be maintained that "ordinarily does not occur" is not equivalent to
"rarely occurs," but only to "occurs less than half the time." Cf. Higginbotham v. Mobil
Oil Corp., 545 F.2d 422, 430 & n.10 (5th Cir. 1977), revd. on othergrounds, 436 U.S. 618
(1978) (res ipsa applied to one of several defendants). Reliance on this weaker sense of
"ordinarily" only makes the problem worse. Unless complications arise more often than
not, they "ordinarily" do not occur in the weak sense of the word. If they "ordinarily" do
not occur, then certainly they "ordinarily" do not occur when reasonable care is taken.
Hence, on this interpretation of "ordinarily does not occur," res ipsa is available for any
medical procedure except one that is beset by complications in more than 50% of its
applications.
32. This is tantamount to saying that the probability of negligence given the fact of
injury exceeds one-half. See note 53 infra.
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care.3 3 In either case, it does not sound like the interpretation of
"ordinarily does not occur" implicit in Dacus.
Now you might think that all these cumbersome statements
about probabilities reduce to the same thing. In the next Section,
however, I will show that they do not, just as the aiticlinal quality of Brannon and Dacus would suggest. You might also object
that the interpretation of "ordinarily does not occur" that I believe undergirds Dacus is too simplistic or literalistic, and that
the putatively strained exegesis in Brannonis more faithful to the
res ipsa doctrine, properly understood. Perhaps so. But to embrace this view is to concede that the "ordinarily does not occur"
language - the core of the res ipsa doctrine as conventionally
formulated - is replete with ambiguity. Furthermore, this latent
ambiguity is of a more than perverse academic interest, for it can
manifest itself in disconcerting ways, as the juxtaposition of cases
like Brannon and Dacus reveals.
I trust, therefore, that it is not too late to suggest that the
phrase "ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence"
can be clarified and improved, and that it is appropriate to pay
careful attention to the possible meanings of the phrase and their
implications. To express the conceivable meanings with precision
and clarity, the language of mathematics is, perforce, invaluable.
Consequently, the next Section of this Article will amplify the
possible interpretations of the "ordinarily does not occur" notion
and translate them into a simple and convenient symbolism.
After a brief discussion of the problem of quantifying the
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, a simple formula called
Bayes's Theorem, which relates the pertinent probabilities, will
be derived. Finally, I will apply Bayes's Theorem to reach a reasonably accurate and workable specification of what is properly
meant by the "ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence" requirement.
II.

THE APPLICATION OF PROBABILITY THEORY

A. Notation
As we have seen, "ordinarily does not occur in the absence
of negligence" might mean any number of things. It could be, and
arguably has been, taken to signify (1) that the probability of the
injury given the exercise of reasonable care is quite small, (2) that
33. See note 18 supra.
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the probability of the injury given reasonable care is smaller than
the probability of the injury given negligence, or (3) that the
probability of the injury given reasonable care is much smaller
than the probability of the injury given negligence. A few symbols
can express these possible interpretations succinctly. The probability of injury given reasonable care will be denoted by P(I IR),
and the probability of injury given negligence by P(I I N). It will
also be helpful to represent the (unconditional) probability of
injury by P(I), the probability of negligence by P(N), and the
probability of negligence given the fact of the injury by P(N 1I).3
In medical malpractice cases like Brannon and Dacus, then,
P(I) stands for the chance that a patient like the plaintiff will be

injured during the surgery. P(N) represents the probability that
the defendant surgeon will be negligent in performing the operation. It may be thought of, in the retrospective context of litigation, as a best estimate of the chance that the defendant acted
negligently, given all the information in the case about the sur-

geon, the surgery, and the patient, but not yet considering that
the plaintiff was injured by the surgery and that no direct evi-

dence of negligence has been adduced. In other words, P(N) denotes the best assessment of the probability of defendant's negligence on the basis of everything but the plaintiff's res ipsa argument.3 5 P(I IR) is the likelihood that a surgeon who exercises rea34. Negligence and reasonable care are defined so as to be mutually exclusive and
collectively exhaustive. That is, either defendant exercised reasonable care, or defendant
was negligent, so that
P(N) + P(R) = P(N) + P(-N) = 1,

where "-N" means "not negligent." It follows that
P(NJI) + P(RII) = 1.
See note 53 infra.
35. For reasons that will be evident when Bayes's Theorem is introduced, P(N) can
be called the "prior probability" of negligence, and P(N II) the "posterior probability" of
negligence. As a first approximation, P(N) might be based entirely on the incidence of
malpractice among local surgeons. A more refined estimate might depart from the overall
incidence of malpractice to take account of, among other things, the medical school
attended by the surgeon, performance as an intern and resident, and the timing of the
operation (early or late shift, early or late in the week).
As one departs from the general category and moves to the details of the particular
operation, the "objective" or "frequency" approach to measuring P(N) must be replaced
with a "subjective" or "personalistic" definition. See generally, e.g., T. FINE, supra note
1; H. KYBURG, supra note 1; Carnap, Two Concepts of Probability, in READINGS IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 438 (1953). The "subjective" interpretation of probability state-

ments is perhaps the most conducive to a description of legal factfinding. See, e.g., Ball,
The Moment of Truth: Probability Theory and Standards of Proof, in ESSAYS ON PROCEDuRE AND EVIDENCE 84 (1961); Cullison, ProbabilityAnalysis of Judicial Fact-Finding:A

PreliminaryOutline of the Subjective Approach, 1 U. TOL. L. REv. 538 (1969). Contra, L.
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sonable care will injure the patient, while P(I I N) is the probability that a negligent surgeon will injure the patient. Since, by
definition, reasonable care should diminish.the probability of injury and negligence should enhance it," one would expect P(I IR)
to be less than P(I IN), and P(I) - the overall probability of
injury associated with the medical procedure, as administered by
the surgeon in question, for patients like the plaintiff - to fall
somewhere between the two. Finally, P(N II) denotes the probability that the surgeon was negligent, taking into account the fact
of injury to the patient (in addition to the information considered
in assessing P(N)).
With this notation, and using the symbol "<" to denote
"less than" and "<<" to denote "much less than," the interpretations of "ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence" that were enumerated above can be written as follows:
P(IIR) << 1

P(I IR) < P(IIN)
P(I IR) << P(IIN)

(1)

(2)
(3)

If we designate the ratio of P(I I R) to P(I I N) by the letter f,
then the three interpretations can be expressed as:
P(IIR) << 1
f< 1
f << 1

(1)
(2)
(3)

Significantly, the res ipsa doctrine is concerned with none of
these probabilities directly. The correctness of the res ipsa inference -

inferring negligence from the fact of injury -

depends

instead on P(N II), the likelihood that the defendant surgeon was
negligent, given the plaintiff's injury. 3 If this probability is too
small, the res ipsa inference is inappropriate; 3 if it is large
supra note 3. Under this interpretation, statements about the frequency of negligence, for example, can be transcribed into statements about the certitude of a rational
juror's belief in negligence. See, e.g., H. PAZER & L. SWANSON, MODERN METHODS FOR
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS (1972). Given a few plausible postulates (that in effect define the
normative notion of rationality, see note 7 supra), these subjective probabilities obey the
rules derived from the standard axioms of probability theory. See, e.g., L. SAVAGE, FOUNCOHEN,

DATIONS OF STATISTICS

(2d ed. 1972); Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual

in the Legal Process, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1329, 1347-49 (1971).
36. See, e.g., United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947);
Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972).
37. Regarding P(NI I) as the crucial probability is something of an oversimplification,
but it is helpful for preliminary analysis and is corrected in text at notes 64-75 infra.
38. But see note 12 supra.
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enough, the inference is justified.39 When cases like Dacus profess
that the inference is proper as long as injuries do not ordinarily
occur if reasonable care is exercised, they are in effect asserting
that as long as condition 1 holds, P(N II) is large enough to
support the inference. 0
To test this assumption, we must first clarify the meaning of
"large enough," a task that can be accomplished by looking to the
burden of proof that the law imposes on the plaintiff. In tort
cases, plaintiffs are said to have the burden of proof: they must
establish all the essential elements of the tort by a preponderance
of the evidence if they are to prevail. It would seem that an
element is established by a preponderance of the evidence if, after
weighing all the evidence, a reasonable juror is persuaded that it
is more likely than not that the element exists." Thus, a jury
should favor the plaintiff on the issue of negligence if and only if
it reasonably believes the probability of negligence given the evidence adduced at trial exceeds one-half. For the plaintiff to avoid

a directed verdict for the defendant where sole reliance is placed
on res ipsa, P(N I I) likewise must exceed one-half.42 This result
may also be derived from more basic assumptions, using the concept of utility.4"
39. Subject to the caveat of note 12 supra,the converse proposition should also hold.
An adequate statement of the res ipsa doctrine should express the necessary and sufficient
conditions for the inference of negligence to be justified. For brevity, however, I shall
mostly ignore stating and proving converses.
40. On the other hand, cases like Brannon, which require a "balance of the probabilities" in favor of negligence, are either stating that the res ipsa inference is proper if
P(N II) > .50, or they are assuming that if condition 2 holds, P(N II) is large enough to
warrant the conclusion of negligence. See note 18 and text at Pote 34 supra. Under this
first interpretation, the "balance of the probabilities" test merely states the standard of
proof generally used in civil litigation. See text at notes 41-43 infra. Under the second
interpretation, the test is misconceived, for condition 2 does not imply that P (N I) is
large enough to support the inference. See Subsection II.B. infra.
41. See, e.g., Ball, supra note 35; Cullison, supra note 35, at 569-71; Lempert, supra
note 6, at 1034 n.38; Winter, The Jury and the Risk of Nonpersuasion,5 LAw & Socy. REv.
335, 337 (1971). Contra, L. COHEN, supra note 3, at 75.
42. A more refined analysis would require that P(N i I&F) > .50 where F is the fact
that the plaintiff relied on res ipsa. See text at notes 58-60 infra. To a first approximation, however, the statement in the text is accurate.
For additional discussion of the relation of P(N II) to directed verdicts, see Tribe,
supra note 35, at 1339 n.33, 1361 nn.101-02. For cases that can be read as holding that
negligence may be found if P(N II) >.50, see, e.g., Hakensen v. Ennis, 584 P.2d 1138, 1139
(Alaska 1978); Riedisser v. Nelson, 111 Ariz. 542, 544, 534 P.2d 1052, 1054 (1975) Siverson
v. Weber, 57 Cal. 2d 834, 372 P.2d 97, 22 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1962); Sommers v. Sisters of
Charity, 277 Or. 549, 555, 561 P.2d 603, 606-07 (1977); Austin v. Sisters of Charity, 256
Or. 179, 187-88, 470 P.2d 939, 943 (1970); Brannon v. Wood, 251 Or. 349, 358, 444 P.2d
558, 562 (1968); Mobil Chem. Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245, 251 (Tex. 1974).
43. If the utilities of correct and mistaken verdicts do not depend on whether the
verdicts favor plaintiffs or defendants, it can be shown that utility will be maximized by
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B. Bayes's Theorem
1. Derivation
Knowing what value of P(N II) is "large enough" to justify
the res ipsa inference," we can turn to the problem of relating this
the following decision rule: decide for the plaintiff if P(N 1I) > .50; otherwise, decide for
the defendant. Such derivations are presented in, e.g., Ball, supra note 35, at 101;
Kaplan, supra note 6, at 1071-72; Lempert, supra note 6, at 1032-35; Tribe, supra note
35, at 1278-81.
Although the mathematics of maximizing utility is not unduly complicated in this
context, how the magnitude of these entities might be determined is a deep problem. In
thinking about the design of legal rules, one can posit rational j dges or legislators who
state legislative preferences - what they think is best for society - for outcomes with
differing risks. If these risk-related preferences obey a few plausible axioms (which explicate the notion of rationality), von Neumann-Morgenstern (N-M) utilities can be used to
construct the matrix. These utilities do not presuppose any natural, universal unit for the
measurement of utility, and the numerical scale that is derived from the N-M "standard
gamble" procedure is arbitrary in that it can always be stretched and shifted by a linear
transformation. See, e.g., W. BAUMOL, supra note 7, at 420-36; cf. Tribe, supra note 35, at
1379-80 (obtaining numerical values for N-M utility functions).
The utilities could also be cast in neoclassical terms. Rather than merely ranking
preferences, the utility functions would then measure the actual strength of preferences.
Even though these utilities might be normalized (emphasizing that they are measured
only in relative units) once this scale is established, meaning would have to be attributed
to differences in magnitude. Although economists tend to eschew this neoclassical conception of utility, some philosophers interested in the design of legal and other basic social
institutions find such cardinal utility functions helpful. See, e.g., R. SARTORIOUS, INDIVIDUAL CONDUCT AND SOCIAL NoRms (1975). The "regret matrices" employed in some discussions of jury fact-finding also lend themselves to a cardinal interpretation. See, e.g.,
Lempert, supra note 6, at 1032.
In important instances, however, P(N 1I) > .50 is not sufficient to warrant the inference of negligence. This is so because the equations displayed so far make no provision
for the legitimate doubt that can arise when plaintiff relies only on the circumstances of
the injury to prove negligence although he has access to evidence that would permit a
more particularized showing. This argument from nonproduction, as I call it, is considered
in detail in text at notes 58-69 infra. Its significance in these direct res ipsa cases is discussed in note 68 infra. An analogous argument helps explain the reluctance of courts to
permit exclusive reliance on statistical evidence in many circumstances. See, e.g., Kaye,
Book Review, 89 YALE L.J. 601 (1980) (forthcoming); Kaye, The Pardox of the Gatecrasherand Other Stories, 1979 Amz. ST. L.J. 101. But see M. FINKELSTEIN, QUANTITATIVE
METHODS IN LAW 59-78 (1978); Tribe, supra note 35, at 1360.
Professor Tribe is highly skeptical of this entire utility approach. See Tribe, supra
note 35, at 1378-86. However, most of his criticisms are peculiar to the criminal context
in which he advances them. His suggestion that utilities may be functions of probability
is reminiscent of Professor Allais's critique of the N-M utility functions on which decision
theory relies. W. BAUMOL, supra note 7, at 428 n.8; H. RAIFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS: INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON CHOICE UNDER UNCERTAINTY (1968). This objection, even if valid,
would not detract from the analysis presented here, which requires only that for every
probability level, the utility matrix be symmetric with equal diagonal elements.
44. Although a fair amount of effort was expended to establish that P(N II) > .50
warrants an inference of negligence from the fact of injury, it turns out that the conclusion
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probability to the three probabilistic interpretations of the crucial
phrase "ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence."
To see the connection in a concrete case, consider the possible
outcomes of surgical procedures like the ones in Brannon and
Dacus. At the outset, the surgeon performs the operation either
negligently or with reasonable care. In the notation introduced
earlier, the probability of negligence is P(N), and that of reasonable care is P(R) = 1 - P(N). Now, if the doctor is negligent, two
things can happen: the patient can be injured, or the patient can
be fortunate and sustain no injury. The probability of injury,
given negligence, we designated P(I IN); that of no injury despite
negligence can be denoted P(-I IN). Similarly, if the physician is
not negligent, the same two outcomes, injury or no injury, are
possible, and the respective probabilities can be written P(I IR)
and P(-I I R). The probabilities of each of the four possible outcomes are now easily computed, as shown in the tree diagram
below:

Probability

Outcome of
Event I
(Negligence
or Reasonable Care)

Probability
(Conditional)

Outcome of
Event 2
(Injury or
No Injury)

Probability
(Joint)

N &I
(patient
M(IIN)

injured,
doctor
negligent)

N
N

Joint
Outcome

P(N&I)

N & -I
(patient
o
OK,

P(-II-

P(N)P(IlN)

P(N&-I) = P(N)P(-IIN)

doctor

negligeni
R&I
(patient
P(IoR)

Irinjured,

P(IR

-I

I-P(N)
R

--

-

P(R&I) =[1-P(N)I P(IJR)

doctor not
negligent)
R & -1
(patient OK,
doctor not
negligent)

_P(R&-I) =[1-P(N)l P(.IIR)

to be drawn as to the proper meaning of "ordinarily does not occur in the absence of
negligence" is not very sensitive to this value. Demanding that P(N II) exceed .40 or .60,
for example, would not affect the results that will be obtained.
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The probabilities at the right are called "joint" probabilities because they concern outcomes determined by two different events
(negligent or not; injured or not) occurring in combination. To
write these expressions for the joint probability of each outcome
I have used the definition of conditional probability: the probability of an outcome A conditional on outcome B is defined as the
probability of the joint occurrence of A and B divided by the
probability of B.4 5 In symbols:

P(AIB) = P(A&B)
P(B)

(4)

Using this definition of conditional probability further, we
can express P(N II) - the single probability on which the res ipsa
inference turns - in terms of the probabilities in the tree diagram. If, in equation 4, A stands for negligence (N) and B for
injury (I), the definition states that
P(NII)

=

P(N&I)
P(I)

Multiplying numerator and denominator by P(N) and substituting P(I&N) for P(N&I)46 yields
P(N) P(I&N)
P(I) P(N)
Recognizing that P (I&N)/P(N) = P(IIN),"7 we obtain
P(NII)

P(NII)

=

P(N)P(IIN)

(5)

P(I)
Looking at the branches of the tree diagram terminating in outcome I,
we find that P(I) = P (either N&I or R&I) = P(N&I) + P(R&I) =

P(N)P(IIN) + (1-P(N))P(IIR). Substituting this into equation 5 gives
the popular version of Bayes's Theorem: 8
45. This formula may be interpreted as stating that the probability of A given B is
the frequency with which A occurs out of all cases in which B occurs. Another way to view
this definition, which may make its meaning more transparent, is to express it in the
equivalent form P(A&B) = P(AjB)P(B). This statement reads that the probability that
the outcomes A and B will occur is equal to the probability that A will occur if B occurs
times the probability that B occurs. To borrow an illustration, suppose that A stands for
a warm day and B for a sunny day. Then the definition of conditional probability tells us
that the probability that it will be both warm and sunny equals the probability that it
will be warm if it is in fact sunny times the pr6bability that it will be sunny. Lempert,
supra note 6, at 1022 n.10.
46. Since the joint outcome I & N is identical to the joint outcome N & I, the
associated probabilities are the same. For example, the probability that tomorrow will be
warm and sunny equals the probability that tomorrow will be sunny and warm.
47. This follows from equation 4, with A = I and B = N.
48. For other versions and derivations of Bayes's rule, see, e.g., Bayes, An Essay
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)=
P(N)P(IIN)
P(N[II) =P(N)P(IIN)
+ (1-P(N))P(IIR)

(6)

Next, we divide both the numerator and denominator by P(N)P(I IN):

01

P(N[I)=1

1 + (1-P(N)) P(IIR)
P(N) P(IIN)

Letting f stand for the fraction P(IIR)

Lettng
sandP(I

IN)

as we did in expressions 2 and 3, we find

1
P(NI) = 1+ (1-P(N))
P(N)

f

which in simpler form reads:
1
1-f + f/P(N)

P(N II)

2.

(7)

Application

With this form of Bayes's Theorem, we can outline the conditions under which a jury should be permitted to conclude that
P(NI I) exceeds .50, i.e., that the defendant was probably negligent. Two distinct situations support the inference of negligence
from the fact of injury. In what might be termed the direct res
ipsa cases, no recourse to the probabilities P(I IN) and P(I IR),

which determine P(N II), is required. Instead, P(N II) itself is the
immediate subject of speculation or testimony. This probability

is estimated directly, on the basis of what the courts call
' 49
"common experience

or, in some cases, expert testimony. 0

Toward Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances, With RichardPrice'sForewordand
Discussion, 53 PHILosoPlicAL TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SocmIY 370 (London 1763),
reprinted in FACSIMIES OF Two PAPERS BY BAYES (W. Deming ed. 1963); H. BRUNK, supra
note 1, at 28-29; J. FREUND, MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS 52-58 (1962); G. Box & G. TAO,
BAYESIAN INFERENCE IN STATISTICAL ANALYSIS (1973); H. RAIFFA, supra note 43. The overenthusiastic use of Bayes's rule has often been criticized. See, e.g., 1 W. FELLER, AN
INTRODUCTION TO PROBABILITY THEORY AND ITS APPLICATIONS 114 (2d ed. 1957); Brilmayer
& Kornhauser, Review: Quantitative Methods and Legal Decisions,46 U. Cm. L. REv. 116
(1979).
49. See cases cited in note 14 supra.
50. In the medical malpractice area, the courts tend to reject lay estimates and insist
on expert testimony pertinent to P(NII). See, e.g., Riedisser v. Nelson, 111 Ariz. 542, 544,
534 P.2d 1052, 1054 (1975). See also Funke v. Fieldman, 212 Kan. 524, 537-38, 512 P.2d
539, 550 (1973).
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Brannon, for example, is a case of this type.5 ' That decision's
reference to the "balance of the probabilities" can best be understood as stating the usual civil burden of proof in the res ipsa
context.2 The proposition that the probabilities point to negli-

gent causes rather than nonnegligent causes is equivalent to the
condition that P(N II) > .50 and therefore justifies a finding of
5 negligence.
In another type of res ipsa case, however, the testimony bears
on P(N II) only indirectly, through estimates of other conditional

probabilities. In Dacus, for instance, the court allowed that
P(NII) could be taken to exceed .50 merely because paralysis
rarely results from a carefully executed mastoidectomy, i.e., because P(I [R) < < 1. In these indirect res ipsa cases, one must go
beyond the traditional observation, central to the direct cases,
that "[a]ll that is needed is evidence from which reasonable men
can say that on the whole it is more likely that there was negli-

gence associated with the cause of the event than that there was
not."" One must ask which of the possible interpretations of
"ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence" permits
51. A useful' illustration of this mode of argument in a res ipsa case not involving
malpractice is provided by Hakensen v. Ennis, 584 P.2d 1138 (Alaska 1978). Mr. and Mrs.
Simonsen set off with their two grandchildren by car to Seattle. Only Mrs. Simonsen knew
how to drive. The remnants of Mr. Simonsen's body were found on a sandbar in a river
in British Columbia. Neither the car nor the other bodies were located. Alleging that Mrs.
Simonsen's negligence resulted in the automobile's plunging into the river, the mother of
the two grandchildren brought a wrongful death action. The defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that she was entitled to bring
the case before the jury by virtue of res ipsa loquitur. The state supreme court observed
that there were a variety of possible explanations for the disappearance, and that many
of these, such as brake failure, the actions of another driver, or criminal activity, did not
involve negligence. It reasoned that the probability of injury due to such nonnegligent
causes (P(-NII)) was at least as large as the probability of injury due to defendant's
negligence (P(N.II)). Hence, the court, on its evaluation of the probabilities, correctly
affirmed the summary judgment for defendant. For another discussion of the probabilities
and their application to unexplained car accident cases, see Jaffe, supra note 12, at 2-6.
52. See notes 18 & 40 supra.
53. For the probabilities to favor negligent causes over nonnegligent ones, P(N II)
> P(-N II). Since P(-N II) = 1 -P (NI1), it follows that P(N I I) > .50. That P(-NI I) =1 P(N II) is established by the following elementary proof:
P(I) = P(I)
P(I) = P((-N & I) or (N & I))
P(I) = P(-N & I) + P(N & I)
P(-N & f)= P(I) -P(N & I)
P(-N & I)IP(I) = 1 - P(N & I)/P(I)
P(-N II)= 1 - P(N II)
54. W. PRossFR, supra note 13, § 39, at 218.
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reasonable persons to say that it is more likely that negligence
caused the injury than not. Does this conclusion that P(N II)>
.50 follow from condition 1, P(I!R) << 1, which asserts that
injuries are unusual when reasonable care is employed? Is it validly drawn on the strength of condition 2, f < 1, which states that
injuries are less frequent when reasonable care is taken than when
negligence is at work? Or.is it best predicated on the stronger
condition 3, f << 1, which demands that injuries be far less
frequent when reasonable care is taken? I shall argue that, except
in a limited class of cases, condition 3 is the most appropriate
standard for permitting the res ipsa inference.
According to equation 7, whether P(N II) exceeds .50, as it
must to justify the res ipsa inference, depends on both P(N), the
prior probability of negligence,, and f, the ratio of the relevant
conditional probabilities. In fact, P(N II) is determined by these
variables in such a way that unless P(N) is very small, none of
the conditions 1 through 3 strictly implies P(N II) > .50.55 For
example, imagine that nine out of ten doctors performing surgery
55. If P(N) is very small, then condition 3 best justifies the inference of negligence.

The proof is straightforward. For P(NI I) to exceed .50, it follows from equation 7 that
P(N)

f < 1-P(N)
For very small P(N), the denominator 1-P(N) can be approximated by 1, and we have
f < P(N)
Finally, since by hypothesis, P(N) is itself much less than one, this last equation becomes
f << 1.
In effect, by focusing attention on a small portion of the f-P(N) plane, we have been able
to overlook the dependence of P(NII) on P(N) without sacrificing much accuracy:

1/2

1

A's negligence may be
region in which P(N)
1-P(N)
<
f
if
inferred
region in which A's negligence may be
inferred iff << 1

P(N)
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to remove meningoceles exercise reasonable care and nothing suggests that the operation in question departs from the usual. Then
P(N) = .10. Assume also that if reasonable care is not taken, the
chance of injury to the patient is quite high, say, P(I IN) = .90.
Finally, suppose that the operation is a dangerous one even with
the best of care, so that P(I I R)= .80. This gives f = .80/.90 = .87
< 1, so condition 2 is satisfied. Inserting these values into equation 7 gives P(N II)= .11. If we have confidence in these hypothetical values for the variables, we should not conclude that the
defendant had been negligent simply because the patient was
injured. Thus, condition 2 -

that f < 1 -

is not sufficient to

establish defendant's negligence at a high enough probability to
meet the appropriate burden of proof. Comparable counterexamples eliminating conditions 1 and 3 can also be constructed."
Nevertheless, there are grounds for preferring condition 3
over 1 or 2. To begin with, we can dispose of the literalist view of
"ordinarily does not occur" expressed in condition 1 as the least
suitable of the trio. Equation 7 reveals that P(N II) is not influenced as much by P(I I R) in isolation as by the ratio f of P(I IR)
to P(i IN). Consequently, conditions 2 and 3 are both more closely
connected to the crucial probability P(N II), and we are left to
choose between (2) f < 1 and (3) f < < 1 as a better statement
of the res ipsa doctrine."
To make this choice, we must advert to a.facet of res ipsa
cases we have not yet considered. Thus far, we have modeled the
res ipsa inference by a single equation that shows how knowledge
of the plaintiff's injury should transform the prior probability of
negligence, P(N), into the posterior probability of defendant's
negligence, P(N fI). In effect, we have assumed the judge or jury
has some unarticulated estimate of the likelihood of defendant's
56. Imagine now that as before P(N) = .10, thatP(I IN) = .90, but thatP(I IR) =.10.
In other words, the operation is not so inherently risky. Then both P(IIR) and f are small,
'but the posterior probability of negligence still does not exceed (although it happens to
equal) .50.
57. I am assuming that a verbal translation of the equation
1- P(N)
which satisfies the constraint P(N II) > .50, see note 55 supra, is unsuitable for reasons
of policy and practice. For a detailed discussion of problems engendered by requiring a
juror to quantify P(N), P(IIR), and P(IIN), and to reason explicitly as Bayes's rule prescribes, see Finkelstein & Fairley, supra note 4; Finkelstein & Fairley, A Comment on
"Trial by Mathematics," 84 HARv. L. REv. 1801 (1971); Tribe, A Further Critique of
MathematicalProof, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1810 (1971); Tribe, supra note 35.
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negligence based on all the available information except that
relating to the res ipsa aspect of the case, and we have shown how
this probabilistic judgment should be modified to take account
of plaintiff's injury and the circumstances under which it occurred. Although useful, this simple model omits an important
aspect of the res ipsa problem: the factfinder has more information than is reflected in P(N II). He also knows the plaintiff has
relied on the res ipsa doctrine and has not brought forward independent, direct evidence of defendant's negligence.5 8 Unless this
failure to produce direct evidence of negligence is explained or
explicable, the factfinder would seem justified in revising his estimate of the probability that defendant's negligence caused plaintiff's injuries.-"
One way to account for this aspect of the res ipsa problem
in mathematical ternis is to treat plaintiff's failure to come forward with direct evidence of negligence (which we may call F) as
an additional datum that modifies P(NI I). If we let N* stand for
NI I, and R* stand for R II, then the probability on which the res
ipsa inference turns is no longer P(NI I), but rather P(N* IF). This
expression for P(N II) as modified by F thus represents the probability that the defendant was negligent, given everything*known
about the accident and the additional fact that the plaintiff has
not poirited to any particular act of negligence by the defendant.'"
Only if this probability exceeds .50 is the inference of negligence
warranted.
This new quantity P(N* IF) can be expanded as prescribed
by Bayes's rule. Analogous to equation 7, we have
58. Sometimes, however, a plaintiff may attempt to prove specific allegations of
negligence while simultaneously relying on res ipsa. E.g., Widmyer v. Southeast Skyways,
Inc., 584 P.2d 1, 11 (Alaska 1978); W. PROSSER, supranote 13, § 40, at 232-33; Carpenter,
supra note 12, at 176-77.
59. For general commentary on the significance of a party's failure to produce favorable evidence, see, e.g., authorities cited in Beaver, Nonproductionof Witnesses as Deliberative Evidence, 1 U. Puoar SouND L. REv. 221, 221 n.1 (1978); Saltzburg, A SpecialAspect
of Relevance: Countering Negative Inferences Associated with the Absence of Evidence,
66 CALwF. L. REv. 1011 (1978). For Bayesian analysis of spoliation evidence, see Kaplan,
supra note 6; Kaye, supra note 43, at 106-08.
60. This probability can also be written asP(N II&F)- explicitly denoting the probability that the defendant was negligent given that the injury has occurred (I) and that the
plaintiff has failed to point to specific negligence on the part of the defendant (F). See
Lempert, supra note 6, at 1044-45. As this notation suggests, P(N*j F) does not generally equal P(N IF). See id. at 1042.
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1
+ f*/P(NII)

P(N*IF) -(1-)

P(F ]R*)
where f*

=

(8),
(9)

P(F IN*)

According to equation 9, the magnitude of P(N* IF) depends bn
P(N II), the probability of the defendant's negligence considering
everything in the case except for plaintiff's failure to adduce evidence of specific negligence, and f*, the ratio of two conditional
probabilities pertaining to this gap in the plaintiff's case. This
equation thus relates the new probability P(N*I F), which takes
account of all facets of a res ipsa case, to the probabilityP(N II)
discussed in this simpler model. As we saw from equation 7,
P(N II) is partly determined by f; accordingly, we have at hand a
formula to connect the competing interpretations 2 and 3 of
"ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence" (which
pertain to f) to the final probability P(N* IF) (which determines
the validity of the res ipsa inference). In particular, for P(N* IF)
to exceed .50 and thereby justify an inference of negligence,
P(N II) must be large enough to satisfy the inequality"
P(NII)> "I---(10)

61.

Equation 8 states that
1
P(N* IF) = 1-f* + f*/P(N II)

For P(N* IF) to exceed .50 we must have
1

.501<

-f* + f*/P(N I I)

Crossmultiplying,
1-f*+

1

<2
P(N II)

-1

<1

P(NII)

P

I
< P(NJI) < P

1lI+
1

if*

___

P(NJI)

P

>

+

f*
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Substituting the expansion of P(NJI) given by equation 7 and
solving for f establishes that P(N* IF) exceeds .50 only if 6
P(N)
f< 1-P(N)

(11)

This result is identical to that derived from the simple model
in all respects save one. Under equation 7, it can be shown that
P(N II) exceeds .50 whenever
P(N)
f 1-P(N)
Expression 11 thus contains tile multiplicative factor 1/f* missing
from the simpler model, so that the critical size of f is inversely
proportional to f*. As a consequence, whenvever the plaintiff's
reliance on res ipsa itself suggests an f* > 1, especially small f's
will be required to warrant an inference of negligence. Unless
P(N) is very large indeed, any f* that is substantially larger than
one will necessitate that f be considerably less than one."3 The
conclusion to be drawn from expression 11, then, is that in the
indirect res ipsa cases in which we can usually expect f* to be
large, the frequency of correct decisions should be enhanced by
adopting condition 3 - that f < 1 - and not the weaker
condition 2 - that f < 1.
62. Substituting the expression for P(N II) given in equation 7 into equation 10 gives
1
f*
(1-f) + f/P(N) < 1 + f*
Inverting the fractions,
1l+f*
1 - f + p-f-f < I+f,
= 11+ 1

P(N)

f*

f

Simplifying further,

" < L

f
(N

_

1 -1 =fT
1
f <-T T/P-(N)

PN

- P(N)
1 P(N)

63. If the prior probability of negligence is .50 and it is 3 times more likely that the
plaintiff would fail to produce direct evidence of negligence if the defendant was not in
fact negligent despite the injury to the plaintiff, then P(N) = .50 and f* = 3. Inequality
11 then tells us that f must be less than 1/3 if P (N*j F) is to be greater than .50. That is,
the probability of injury to the plaintiff must be at least 3 times higher if negligence is
assumed than if it is absent in order for it to be more likely than not that the defendant
was actually negligent.
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But when should we consider f* sufficiently large to insist
that the accident be much more likely to occur given negligence
than in the absence of negligence? The answer depends on
whether the plaintiff has access to direct evidence of the defendant's negligence. Two situations may be distinguished." The
first is where the only evidence presented is of the injury and its
circumstances, and other evidence of negligence should have been
available to the plaintiff. Here, it would seem substantially more
likely that the plaintiff would fail to offer such direct evidence if
that evidence were damaging - i.e., if the defendant acted reasonably - than if the defendant were negligent. But this is to
say that P(FIR*)>>P(FIN*). Hence,from equation 9, f*>>l,
and, to counterbalance this consideration, the injury must have
been much more likely with negligence than with reasonable care.
In the second situation, the plaintiff offers evidence only of
the injury but lacks access to any other evidence bearing on the
probability of negligence.65 Here, we cannot always surmise that
f*> > 1. Under such circumstances, the probability that the
plaintiff would fail to adduce such evidence is roughly the same
whether or not the defendant was negligent. In symbolic terms,
P(FIR*) is approximately equal to P(FI N*), and therefore the
ratio f* is close to one. Accordingly, the plaintiff's nonproduction
64. I am indebted to Richard Lempert for suggesting a similar categorization.
65. A variety of factors may block a plaintiff's access to evidence of specific negligent
acts. For a sampling of ways in which the plaintiff might explain a failure to make a
particular showing and thereby justify treating f* as small, see, e.g., Beaver, supra note
59, at 229-47.
Some jurisdictions go so far as to require that knowledge of the causes of the injury
be more accessible to the defendant than the plaintiff. See, e.g., SPEISEn, THE NEGLIGENCE
CASE: REs IPSA LoQurruR § 2:26, at 83-84 (1972). Some commentators have insisted that
such superior knowledge on the defendant's part is essential to the application of the
doctrine. See, e.g., Carpenter, supra note 12, at 472; Jaffe, supra note 12. Although, in
some instances, this consideration might justify imposing liability in the absence of a .50
probability of negligence (see note 12 supra)and the defendant's superior access ordinarily
would justify taking f* to be no greater than one, f* should also be close to one where
neither party has superior access. The defendant's superior access therefore seems too
stringent a limitation to the res ipsa doctrine, and many courts are satisfied as long as
each side has equal access to evidence of the causes of the accident. See, e.g., Widmyer
v. Southeast Skyways, Inc., 584 P.2d 1, 12-13 (Alaska 1978).
Of course, where a defendant does have superior access to knowledge of the causes of
the injury and yet fails to introduce any evidence tending to disprove negligence, the
inference of negligence seems to be strengthened. In this situation, we need not require
f << 1. Cf. Tribe, supra note 35, at 1339 n.3 (arguing for directed verdicts in these
circumstances). The mathematics of this situation is analogous to that expressed by
equation 11. The likelihood ratio f however, would relate to defendant's failure to come
forward with evidence to which he has superior access. Still, given modem discovery
procedures, a defendant may only rarely have such superior knowledge. But see Jaffe,
supra note 12.
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does not alone warrant a requirement that f < < 1. Even in this
situation, however, we may appropriately require f <<1 in an
important subclass of cases. Where the defendant offers evidence
tending to disprove negligence, this reduces the value of P(N). 1
If it makes P(N) very small, neither P(NI I) nor P(N*,I F) will be
greater than .50 unless f is also very small. 7 Although a jury
should not necessarily be bound by defendant's evidence, it must
weigh it; if the evidence is at all credible, it would be unreasonable to accept a res ipsa theory unless f < < 1.
To illustrate this logic, consider the case of a light pl
lane that
disappears in fair weather. The widow of the passenger sues the
estate of the pilot and invokes res ipsa. She argues that, in general, light aircraft are so well engineered and maintained that the
chance of a mishap is slight when they are flown carefully, while
the chance of an accident is somewhat larger when the pilot errs
(for example, by not performing a complete preflight instrument
check or taking on enough gasoline for the flight). Because the
"balance of the probabilities" thus favors negligence, plaintiff
contends that a jury should find defendant liable.
As presented, this is an indirect res ipsa case."8 The probabil66. Where the evidence directly negates specific acts of negligence (for example,
testimony of ground control personnel shows that the pilot of a plane that collided with
another was flying at the designated altitude), presentation of such evidence may indicate
that the plaintiff should have been able to offer direct evidence if negligence (given injury)
was indeed present. If so, the case is of the first type - the plaintiff appears to have access
to the evidence that would have enabled a particularized showing of negligence. In these
circumstances, the values reasonably assigned to both f* and P(N) necessitate f << 1 to
support a res ipsa theory.
67. See note 55 and equation 11 supra.It is tempting to think that P(N) could always
be taken to be small in res ipsa cases, thereby justifying the f << 1 standard without
recourse to be more complex argument about P(N* I F). Isn't reasonable care, after all,
defined by reference to the norm (the "ordinary man") and negligent conduct identified
in terms of abnormal or unusual behavior? The blanket assumption that P(N) << 1, is
shaky, however, for two reasons. First, there are situations in which the normally (or even
universally) observed precautions do not amount to reasonable care. See, e.g., Low v.
Park Price Co., 95 Idaho 91, 503 P.2d 291 (1972); Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42
COLUM. L. REv. 1147 (1942). Second, even if reasonable care does predominate in an
activity, the evidence, while not directly revealing a specific act of negligence, may suggest that defendant is more likely to have been negligent than the average (randomly
selected) person, or that he is more likely to have been negligent at the time in question.
Consider, for instance, P(N) for an inexperienced physician - say a United States
citizen who received his medical training in Mexico. Even if a juror were convinced that
P(N) is small for physicians in general, he might well select some large value to characterize this defendant's activities in a malpractice case. For such reasons, the analysis
offered here takes P(N) to be much less than one only in those cases in which defendant's
evidence justifies this premise.
68. If the plaintiff's argument is slightly recast, however, a direct res ipsa case results.
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ities being compared are the probability of injury given reasonable care, P(II R), and the probability of injury given negligence,
P(II N). The plaintiff asserts that since the first probability exceeds the second (f <1), chances are that the defendant was negligent (P(N II) > .50). But f < 1 is not enough to support res ipsa
in this situation. The stronger condition f < < 1 is more appropriate, for it appears that the plaintiff had access to information that
might have revealed specific acts of negligence yet did not produce that evidence. Rather than asking the jury to speculate
about whether the pilot took on sufficient gas, for instance, the
plaintiff could have produced the airport employee who was dispensing gasoline when the pilot took off. That the plaintiff did not
do so strongly suggests that the testimony would not have helped
establish negligence (f* > > 1). Of course, the testimony might
not have disproved negligence (if it did, the defendant presumably would have offered it); but the plaintiff's failure to make
a particularized showing of this kind attenuates the implication
of negligence and thus justifies a verdict for the defendant unless the jury finds that the probability of airplane crashes is not
slightly higher but far higher if pilots are negligent (f << 1).
If this latter condition is fulfilled, then there are good grounds
for concluding that the defendant was probably negligent
(P(N* IF) > .50) despite the plaintiff's evidentiary shortcomings."
Suppose, however, that the plane was last seen flying over an
island at a low altitude. The wreckage of the craft is found, nose
down, in tidal water. The defendant's expert witness testifies that
0

Suppose that an expert formerly employed by the FAA as-an investigator of the causes of
aircraft mishaps testifies that in his experience 60% of all light airplane crashes that
occurred in good weather were the result of one simple pilot error - failing to maintain a
sufficient supply of gasoline in the fuel tank. Unless some evidence is adduced to show

that the pilot in this case took on enough fuel, plaintiff could argue that the "balance of
the probabilities" favors negligence because the testimony indicates (directly, without
recourse to Bayes's Theorem) that P(N II) = .60 > .50.
The argument from nonproduction applies here, however, and suggests that we may
wish to demand an especially high P(NI I) to permit the inference of negligence. Using
the notation previously explained in the text, we are actually interested in P(N* I F) rather
than P(NI I). According to equation 10, P(N* IF) > .50 only if

f*
)>
P(
PN)>1
+ f
In the illustration here, P(NI I) is estimated on the basis of the expert statistical testimony
to be .60. For all f* > 1.5, P(NI I) = .60 is therefore not large enough to justify the inference
of negligence.
69. The circumstances under which directed verdicts are appropriate in res ipsa cases
depend on the procedural significance of the inference. See note 11 supra.
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the weather was unstable the day of the flight and that a snow
squall was observed in the vicinity of the flight path. The expert
suggests that the pilot was proceeding in clear air when he encountered the storm and was attempting to land when the craft
was struck by a sudden gust of wind. The plaintiff argues that
this scenario, while possible, is not probable. She contends that,
especially in bad weather, negligence enhances the probability of
a crash. Because the likelihood of the accident given negligence
exceeds the likelihood in the absence of negligence, the plaintiff
urges that the pilot was probably negligent.
Here, a jury may justifiably find for the plaintiff. The inference of negligence is not attenuated by the plaintiff's failure to
delineate what took place in the minutes before the crash, for no
one can do this. Here f* 1, and P(N*I F)
P(NI I); hence,
P(N* IF) can easily exceed .50 if f is merely less than 1.
On the other hand, if the defendant introduces further evidence tending to disprove negligence, the plaintiff should not
prevail simply because negligence usually enhances the risk of
injury. Imagine that in our second hypothetical incident, the defendant calls to the stand an expert on aviation in the region who
testifies that the pilot, whom he had supervised and trained, was
skilled, attentive to problems of unstable weather in the area, and
had approximately 3,000 hours of flight experience. Such a pilot
is less likely to be negligent (diminishing the value of P(N)), and
it is therefore appropriate to require the plaintiff to show that a
crash like that which occurred is far more likely to happen due
to negligent pilot error than in the absence of negligence (f << 1).
In short, when a plaintiff attempts to prove negligence indirectly, by testimony or argument directed to the frequency of
accidents in the absence or presence of negligence, it is generally
necessary to show that the likelihood of injury is substantially
larger with negligence than without, and not merely that the
"balance" of these conditional probabilities slightly favors injury
given negligence or that injuries are rare without negligence. The
only exception to requiring that f be much less than one would
seem to be where the plaintiff has no access to any other evidence
and the defendant offers no evidence tending to disprove negligence.
III.

CONCLUSION

The argument developed in this Article has been complex
and, I fear, slightly lengthy. It may be advisable to restate my
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essential points and to elaborate briefly on their implications. We
began by observing that "ordinarily does not occur in the absence
of negligence" - the traditional, indeed canonical, formulation
of the grounds for inferring negligence from the fact of injury sounds simple, clear, and correct. Yet, it is none of these. Beneath
its superficial simplicity lurks a multiplicity of possible meanings. And the most natural interpretation countenances, if not
encourages, opinions like Dacus that permit a finding of negligence merely because the accident in question occurs but rarely."
We therefore turned to some elementary probability theory
to specify the proper grounds for the res ipsa inference. The first
major step in the probabilistic analysis was the recognition that
it is the probability of negligence given injury, P(N II), which, at
least for a first approximation, forms the empirical foundation for
the inference of negligence. Whenever P(N ,I)
exceeds .50, inferring negligence will produce fewer mistaken verdicts than refusing to infer negligence. Ordinarily, ain estimate of this probability
either is within the direct knowledge of the jury or can be reached
through expert testimony. The typical jury instructions - asking
whether accidents of the kind at bar are more likely to result from
negligence than from other causes - adequately convey this idea.
But emphasis on (P(N II) does not exhaust the content of the
res ipsa inference. Indeed, if that were all there is to it, one might
well wonder why courts and commentators ever thought it important to speak of what !'ordinarily does not occur in the absence
of negligence." Bayes's Theorem, used as a scalpel to dissect the
inference, suggests a possible motivation for the "ordinarily does
not occur" language. The theorem reveals that the decisive probability P(N I-I)
can be expressed as a function of other probabilities; accordingly, one can think of the phrase "ordinarily does not
occur" as a way to get at these probabilities. Unfortunately, the
traditional phraseology fails to elucidate the relationship. Instead, it seems to murmur, sotto voce, that the defendant may
be found liable as long as injuries are infrequent when reasonable
care is taken. 71 Yet, the basic teaching of Bayes's formula is that
this factor must be considered in conjunction with the frequency
of injuries given negligence.
We therefore asked what relationship between these two
probabilities most likely indicates that P(N I) exceeds .50. The
70. See text at notes 25-31 supra.
71. Id.
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analysis was complicated by the fact that the so-called prior
probability of negligence also affects P(N II). We sought to circumvent that complication by considering the potential access of
the plaintiff to more particularized evidence. That additional
datum led us to replace P(NI I)with P(N*I F)as the crucial proba-.
bility in res ipsa cases. Analysis of this new quantity P(N*IF)
then supported the general requirement that the jury find an
injury to be much more likely to result with negligence than without. In particular, using Bayes's Theorem iteratively, we justified
the "much more likely" standard for all cases but those where the
plaintiff has no access to any evidence that would permit a particularized showing of negligence and the defendant introduces no
7
evidence tending to disprove negligence. 1
In sum, talk of what "ordinarily does not occur in the absence
of negligence" should always be avoided. In one major category
of cases all that is involved is a direct estimate of P(N* IF). In
these direct cases, reference to what "ordinarily does not occur"
amounts to surplusage, and potentially misleading surplusage at
that. Instead, the jury should simply be instructed to find for the
plaintiff if it is more probable that the accident was caused by
some negligent act of the defendant than bisome other cause. In
the other major category of res ipsa cases, the plaintiff relies on
common experience or on evidence concerning the relative frequency of accidents with and without negligence. In these indirect cases, "ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence" is ambiguous, and seems to include but one of two vital
ingredients in the indirect estimation of P(N* I.F). The belief that
an accident is unlikely to occur if reasonable care is taken (or that
it is slightly more likely to occur if negligence is present) is insufficient to support a verdict for the plaintiff. With limited exceptions, for an accident to warrant the conclusion that P(N* IF)
exceeds .50, it must be the kind of accident that is substantially
more unlikely to occur when reasonable care is observed.
Of course, it may be that not many verdicts will change if
these recommendations are adopted. But there is ample basis to
72. Furthermore, we noted that this logic also militates in favor of modifying the
conventionally accepted standard in the direct res ipsa cases. As in the indirect cases, if
probabilities are estimated solely on the basis of the frequencies of negligence and reasonable care in other accidents of the same type, and if there is an unexplained lack of
particularized proof, then negligence should not be inferred unless the probability that the
accident resulted from defendant's negligence is substantiallygreater than the probability
that the injury was a consequence of some other cause. See notes 53 & 68 supra.
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hope that the quality of decisions in res ipsa cases will be enhanced. Surely, the attempt to improve on the traditional formulation of res ipsa loquitur is worth the bother. The justification
lies both in the pedantic but real concern for clarity, consistency,
and correctness in propositions of law, and in the professional
faith that pursuit of these goals will produce, when all is said and
done, fairer results for all litigants.

